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Abstract
The reservoir of Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam was filled in December 2015. The dam’s planning, licensing and con-
struction had rolled inexorably forward despite opposition from local victims of this development and from a 
wide array of other actors. Logical, legal and ethical arguments had less effect than the political and business 
forces prioritizing the dam. Part of the environmental destruction and human-rights violation at Belo Monte 
was apparently financed by taxpayers in North America and Europe with funds passed through Brazil’s Na-
tional Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) from development policy loans (DPLs) to Brazil by 
the World Bank. This opens the opportunity for World Bank reforms to eliminate loopholes allowing funding 
through financial intermediaries. The human and environmental cost of Belo Monte should also give pause to 
governments and financial institutions in promoting dams as their primary response to energy issues.
Vol. 148, No. 1  ·  Research article
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Zusammenfassung
Der Stausee des brasilianischen Belo Monte Staudamms wurde im Dezember 2015 geflutet. Planung, Lizensierung und Bau des Staudamms waren trotz des Widerstands der von diesen Entwicklungen lokalen Betroffenen sowie 
eines breiten Spektrums anderer Akteure unerbittlich vorangeschritten. Logische, rechtliche und ethische Argu-
mente hatten geringere Wirkung als die den Staudamm priorisierenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Kräfte. Ein Teil der Umweltzerstörungen und Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Belo Monte werden offenkundig durch die 
Steuerzahler in Nordamerika und Europa insofern über Mittel mitfinanziert, die Brasilien seitens der Weltbank als sogenannte development policy loans (DPL) erhielt und die über die nationale Entwicklungsbank (BNDES) zur 
Verfügung gestellt wurden. Dies eröffnet die Chance für Weltbank-Reformen, um Hintertüren zu schließen, die 
Finanzierungen durch Kreditvermittler ermöglichen. Die sozialen und ökologischen Kosten von Belo Monte sollten 
ebenso Regierungen und Finanzinstitutionen Einhalt dabei gebieten, Staudämme als ihre Hauptantwort auf Ener-
giefragen anzupreisen.
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1.  Introduction 
Belo Monte is a hydroelectric dam on Brazil’s Xingu 
River, a north-flowing tributary to the Amazon River (Fig. 1). The reservoir was filled in December 2015 
and generation is officially projected to begin in 2016 
at the 233-MW auxiliary powerhouse, with the full 
11,233-MW installed capacity to be completed in 2019 (Brazil, MME/EPE 2015: 100). When fully operational 
the dam will leave a 100-km stretch of river with only 
20% of its normal flow, directly affecting two indig-enous areas and a population of traditional riverside dwellers (ribeirinhos) on this “reduced flow” stretch, 
plus a third indigenous area on the Bacajá (a small 
tributary entering the Xingu in this stretch), among other impacts (Fig. 2). Other ribeirinhos and part of 
the city of Altamira, Pará are flooded by the reservoir. 
Great as the impacts of Belo Monte itself are, they pale in comparison to the impacts this dam is expected to unleash as the driving force for construction of other 
dams further upstream, especially the Babaquara 
Dam (officially renamed as the “Altamira” Dam). 
The Xingu River has one of the greatest annual vari-
ations in water flow of all Amazon tributaries, with 
high-water season flows up to 60 times those of the 
low-water season. During three months of the year, 
the low-flow period leaves the river with insufficient 
water to turn even one of the 20 turbines in the dam’s 
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Fig. 1 
Locations mentioned in the text.
Dams: 
1.) Belo Monte, 
2.) Balbina, 
3.) Tucuruí, 
4.) Jirau, 
5.) Santo Antônio,
6.) Cachoeira Riberão
     (Guajará-Mirim), 
7.) Babaquara (Altamira), 
8.) Chacorão, 
9.), São Luiz do Tapajós, 
10.) Jatobá.  
Source: Own elaboration
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11,000-MW main powerhouse, leaving only the 233-
MW auxiliary powerhouse in operation. Belo Monte is 
a run-of-river dam, not a storage dam, and its electri-
cal generation therefore depends entirely on the riv-
er’s flow each day. Because the turbines are the most 
expensive part of any hydroelectric project, building 
a dam that leaves 11,000 MW idle for three months is 
difficult to explain as a financial and economic deci-
sion. The answer to how such a dam could possibly be 
considered lies in officially denied plans to build other dams upstream of Belo Monte in order to store water 
for release during the low-flow period. These dams 
would flood vast areas of indigenous land. Protec-
tions in Brazil’s laws, constitution and international 
agreements were bypassed repeatedly as the Belo 
Monte project advanced (Fearnside, forthcoming). Op-
posing efforts from local people, environmental and human-rights organizations and the academic com-
munity were much larger than in the cases of other high-impact Amazonian dams such as those on the 
Madeira and Tapajós Rivers, yet the project advanced 
inexorably to make Belo Monte a fait accompli. The 
dam project was impervious to all arguments – logi-
cal, legal and moral – and was successful at obtaining 
support in the government agencies that promoted it, 
in the banks that financed it and in the companies that 
invested in it. How did this happen and what lessons can be learned? 
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2.   Actors in the Belo Monte struggle
2.1 Pro-dam actorsA range of actors make up the two sides of the Belo 
Monte struggle. Pro-dam actors include the construc-tion companies and industries producing aluminum 
and other electro-intensive commodities, consulting 
firms that prepare impact reports in the licensing 
process, the various groups of individual “barragei-
ros” (engineers and other professionals, including 
some academics, who work in the dam-building ef-
fort), and government agencies that plan and promote 
dams, such as Brazilian Electrical Centers (Centrais 
Elétricas Brasileiras = ELETROBRÁS), the Energy Re-search Enterprise (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética = 
EPE), and the National Agency for Electrical Energy (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica = ANEEL). There 
are also influential business interests that profit from 
selling goods and services to the dam-building effort, 
including the commercial elite of Altamira. In 2009 local entrepreneurs and others supporting the dam 
founded the Regional Forum for Economic and Socio-Environmental Development of the Transamazon 
Highway and Xingu (Fórum Regional de Desenvolvi-
mento Econômico e Socioambiental da Transamazônica 
e Xingu = Fort Xingu). Finally, there are politicians at 
all levels who find major projects like dams useful as 
visible achievements that can win votes in subsequent 
elections. In January 2013 Brazil’s Supreme Elector-
al Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral = TSE) released 
information for the first time on political campaign donations: the top four contributors to political cam-paigns in Brazil in the preceding decade were con-struction companies that build dams in Amazonia (Gama 2013). Three of the four largest donors to the 
2010 presidential campaign of Brazil’s current presi-
dent were large construction firms (Zampier 2010).In the Lava Jato (“Car Wash”) investigation into a mas-
sive corruption scandal initially focused on PETRO-
BRÁS (the government oil company), several execu-tives who have cooperated with the investigation in exchange for lighter sentences have stated that the 
same arrangements that apply to the petroleum sec-
tor also apply to the electrical sector (Casado 2015; see: Stauffer 2015). The chief executive officer of the 
Camargo Corrêa construction company has confessed 
to paying bribes to obtain construction contracts for Belo Monte (Amazonas em Tempo 2015). The Andrade 
Gutierrez construction company also paid bribes for 
Belo Monte contracts, and the former CEO of that com-
pany is currently negotiating to reveal details as part 
of a deal allowing him to leave federal prison for house arrest while he faces charges from federal prosecu-
tors for “corruption, money laundering and participa-
tion in a criminal organization” (Carvalho and Megale 
2016).
As compared to options such as energy conserva-
tion or ceasing aluminum export, dams have a great advantage in the decision-making process due to the 
possibility of the decision makers and their political 
parties obtaining financial support from contrac-
tors interested in the construction projects, whether 
this is obtained as legal political donations, as illegal 
donations to secret slush funds (“caixas dois”), or as 
outright bribes to key politicians. In March 2016 the 
former leader of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Tra-
balhadores = PT) in the Senate made a lengthy confes-
sion to federal prosecutors in exchange for leniency in the Lava Jato corruption probes. His 254-page sworn 
affidavit (do Amaral 2016) was released by the federal 
judge in charge of the case; it includes the following on 
Belo Monte (pp. 69-70):
‘‘The Belo Monte bribe [propina] served as a decisive 
contribution to the election campaigns of 2010 and 
2014. The main negotiating agent for the Belo Mon-
te Consortium was the contractor FLAVIO BARRA of 
[the construction firm] ANDRADE GUTIERREZ. The 
numbers for the bribe were around R$30 million 
[then ~US$ 15 million] for election campaigns. DEL-
CÍDIO DO AMARAL believes that the final figures for 
bribery are higher because during the campaign 
an agreement was made with respect to “claims” 
presented by the Consortium of about R$1.5 bil-
lion [~US$750 million]. The agreement regarding 
“claims” was one of the conditions required for in-
creasing the companies’ election contributions. And 
it must be said that the actions of the “triumvirate” 
composed of SILAS RONDEAU [Minister of Mines 
and Energy 2005-2007], ERENICE GUERA [head of 
the Civil House during the 2010 election campaign] 
and ANTONIO PALOCCI [head of the Civil House in 
2011] were fundamental to reaching [agreement on] 
the corporate and business design of the Belo Monte 
Project. DELCÍDIO estimates that the value for the 
contributions to the campaigns (2010 and 2014) of 
the PMDB and PT reached approximately R$45 mil-
lion [~US$23 million].”
Dilma Vana Rousseff (known simply as “Dilma,” Bra-
zil’s president since January 2011) served on the 
energy-policy committee of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
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(better known as “Lula”) in 2002 in preparing his can-
didacy for the October 2002 presidential election that 
initiated the PT administration of the federal govern-
ment. President Lula appointed Dilma as Minister of 
Mines and Energy, where she served from 2003 un-
til 2005, when a corruption scandal (the “Mensalão”) 
forced President Lula to replace the presidential 
chief-of-staff (head of the “Civil House” or Casa Civil); 
Dilma’s promotion to that office made her the second 
most powerful person in the country from 2005 un-
til her own presidential candidacy in 2010. During 
this time she became known as the “mother of the 
PAC,” referring to the “Program for the Acceleration 
of Growth” (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), 
a package of projects launched in January 2007 that 
included many dams, among them Belo Monte. During the 2010 presidential campaign her advertising fea-
tured the phrase “mother of the PAC.”
Dilma’s personal involvement in championing Belo Monte has made her the most important actor on the 
pro-dam side. An emblematic event was a ministerial meeting in 2011 where the minister of the environ-ment attempted to raise the issue of criticism of the 
Belo Monte Dam. The Folha de São Paulo newspaper 
reported that President Dilma cut the minister off, 
shouting “You must understand, once and for all, that 
this project is good, important for the country, and it 
will be done”; the report goes on to state that “from 
then on no one objected to anything else, and all of 
the ministers began to publically defend the dam as 
a strategic project for the country’s infrastructure” (Magalhães 2011).
The head of the Federal Attorney General’s Office (Advocacia Geral da União = AGU), a presidential ap-
pointee, has repeatedly managed to obtain judicial 
decisions from a select set of judges to overturn pre-
liminary decisions (liminares) issued by lower courts to halt Belo Monte pending consultation of the indig-
enous peoples or other preconditions for the dam. A 
small set of federal judges can be counted on to quick-
ly issue decisions overruling these impediments (e.g., 
Millikan and Hurwitz 2011). These judges are, there-
fore, among the key actors on the pro-dam side. 
At least 60 legal contestations are still pending against 
Belo Monte in Brazilian courts, including 22 public civ-il suits (AIDA 2015). The impacted indigenous people 
have not been consulted as required by International 
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 (ILO 1989), 
which Brazil signed in 1991, ratified in 2002 and con-
verted into Brazilian law in 2004 (Brazil, PR 2004). In 
2012 the Regional Federal Court of 1st Region (TRF-
1) found in favor of the indigenous people in one such 
suit (Civil Appeal nº 2006.39.03.000711-8), thus pro-viding a more substantial legal barrier to continuing 
construction. The head of the AGU was able to obtain 
a private audience with the chief justice of Brazil’s 
Supreme Court and convince him to accept an appeal 
that would allow the dam to go forward in practice. 
During the four days that Belo Monte’s construction was halted several members of the executive branch 
of the government were received by the chief justice 
and no representatives of civil society were received (International Rivers 2012; ISA 2012). The decision, 
which was made by the chief justice without consult-
ing any of the other justices in the Supreme Court, al-lowed construction to continue pending a decision on 
the merits of the case at some unspecified future time. 
This occurred only two weeks before the chief justice 
was to reach the mandatory retirement age and was 
in the middle of the high-priority trial of the “men-
salão” corruption scandal (see: Sevá-Filho 2014). Since this 2012 decision the Belo Monte case has never ap-
peared on the schedule of the Supreme Court for con-
sideration, and the dam has, in practice, been built.
2.2  Anti-dam actorsOn the anti-dam side there have been the various groups of Indigenous people (both upstream and 
downstream of Belo Monte), the traditional non-in-digenous riverside dwellers (ribeirinhos) both from 
the stretch of river to be flooded and from the Big 
Bend, and many Altamira residents. An important lo-
cal actor opposing Belo Monte has been the Catholic 
Church in Altamira. Dom Erwin Kräutler, Bishop of 
the Xingu, has been an outspoken critic of the dam 
plans ever since they became public. Due to the risks inherent in taking this position he has 24-hour secu-
rity guards and wears a bullet-proof vest under his vestments (Bratman 2014: 284). Dom Erwin has had 
access to high-level government officials, and it was 
to him that President Lula famously promised not to 
“ram Belo Monte down anyone’s throat” in July 2009 (International Rivers 2009). Dom Erwin later conclud-
ed that “none of Lula’s promises have been kept” (Ca-
lixto 2015).A group of national-level Brazilian NGOs has support-ed the local anti-dam movement and has publicized 
the dam’s implications and tried to influence govern-
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A key organization of local non-indigenous dam oppo-
nents was founded in 1987: the Movement for the Sur-
vival of the Transamazon Highway (Movimento pela 
Sobrevivência da Transamazônica = MPST), renamed 
in 1998 as the Movement for the Development of the 
Transamazon Highway and the Xingu (Movimento pelo 
Desenvolvimento da Transamazônica e Xingu = MDTX). 
This organization was to play an important role in re-
sisting the proposals for the “Altamira Complex” (Belo 
Monte and Babaquara) until the group split in 2008. 
In August 2001 MDTX brought together 113 social or-
ganizations to draft a document entitled “SOS Xingu: A call for good sense on the damming of rivers in Ama-
zonia” (MDTX 2001).
On 25 August 2001 the head of MDTX (Ademir Albeu 
Federicci, known as “Dema”) was assassinated (ISA 2001; Switkes 2001). Dema is regarded as a martyr in 
the struggle against Belo Monte. Although two gun-
men were arrested, their patrons were never identi-
fied (preventing confirmation of whether the gunmen 
were paid by the dam proponents or by other inter-ests in the Altamira area that were also displeased 
with MDTX).
When the PT won Brazil’s presidential election in Oc-
tober 2002 and Lula took office in January 2003, many opponents of Belo Monte expected this to decrease or 
end federal government support for Belo Monte, but the opposite turned out to be the case (see: Sevá-Filho 
2014). Many dam opponents had ties and overlapping 
interests with the PT, causing predictable strains (e.g., 
Scholz et al. 2004: 53-56). Under the PT administra-
tion, the federal government made substantial sums 
available to NGOs through contracts for a variety of 
social and environmental projects, thus presenting 
an additional temptation for civil-society groups to 
moderate their criticisms of priority projects like Belo 
Monte.
The MDTX continued to oppose Belo Monte and suf-
fered harassment from ELETRONORTE (the govern-
ment electrical company leading the preparations for 
Belo Monte) (Melo 2005). However, a split was devel-
oping within MDTX, with various members becoming 
dam supporters. The Live, Produce and Preserve Foun-dation (Fundação Viver, Produzir e Preservar = FVPP) 
had been created in 1998 as the legal entity for the 
MDTX, and this status allowed it to compete for gov-
ernment contracts. In 2006 FVPP produced a report 
on the history of MDTX (published by the Ministry of 
ment decisions. Especially active have been the Socio-Environmental Institute (Instituto Socioambiental = 
ISA) [www.socioambiental.org.br/], Friends of the Earth Brazilian Amazonia (Amigos da Terra Amazônia Bra-
sileira) [www.amazonia.org.br/]; the Pro-Indian Com-
mission of São Paulo (Comissão Pró-Índio de São Paulo 
= CPISP) [www.cpisp.org.br/], the Pastoral Land Com-mission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra = CPT) [www.
cptnacional.org.br/] and the Movement of Dam-Af-
fected People (Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens 
= MAB) [www.mabnacional.org.br/]. International 
NGOs playing similar support roles have included Cul-
tural Survival [https://www.culturalsurvival.org/], 
International Rivers [www.internationalrivers.org/] 
and AmazonWatch [http://amazonwatch.org/]. Indigenous groups and their leaders have been at the 
center of the Belo Monte struggle. They have main-
tained pressure on government officials through a long series of demonstrations and direct actions such 
as occupations of government offices or of construc-
tion sites. However, a serious loss on the anti-dam 
side has been the dam consortium’s successes in co-
opting some key indigenous leaders. This is done by giving material rewards such as outboard motor-
boats, vehicles, fuel and foodstuffs to selected lead-
ers (e.g., Heurich 2013). Much of this was part of the 
“Emergency Plan” agreed to by the consortium as a 
two-year program while the dam’s Basic Environ-
mental Plan (Plano Básico Ambiental = PBA) was be-ing prepared (Norte Energia SA 2011). Internal pres-sures within the indigenous groups could then lead 
to silencing group members who had previously been 
outspoken critics of Belo Monte. It has also led to the 
fission of numerous indigenous villages (the number 
of villages increased from 19 to 39 between 2010 and 
2015), both as a result of disagreements over opposi-tion to Belo Monte and as a means of obtaining access to the material handouts from the dam consortium for 
sub-groups within the indigenous communities, since 
distribution of the benefits within communities was 
very uneven (Queiroz 2015). The voices of the three 
downstream indigenous groups, which are the ones 
most directly affected by the Belo Monte Dam itself, 
have fallen silent in recent years. A notable event was 
a major gathering organized by ISA in Altamira in September 2013 bringing together indigenous groups 
from the whole length of the Xingu River, but repre-
sentatives of the three downstream groups (Juruna 
de Paquiçamba, Arara da Volta Grande do Xingu, and 
Xikrin do Bacajá) did not come (personal observa-
tion).  
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the Environment); the report only mentions a posi-tion of the group against Belo Monte as a thing of the 
past – in the 1990s before the name was changed from 
“survival” to “development” (FVPP 2006: 35). The as-
sassination of Dema did not merit mention in the 65-
page “history.” However, only in 2008 did FVPP for-
mally decide to “not oppose” Belo Monte, ostensibly so 
as to assure that the Transamazon Highway would be paved (Bratman 2015: 70). In addition to the influence 
of the PT affiliations of the organization’s leadership, 
the government’s linking of the highway paving to the 
dam proposal had succeeded as a “wedge” to split op-position social groups in the Altamira area (Bratman 
2014: 277). Recently FVPP has been indignant that the dam consortium has not kept its promises for a 
series of actions that would benefit local farmers, as 
stipulated in the “preconditions” (condicionantes) for licensing Belo Monte (Brito 2015).
In 2008 the portion of MDTX opposing Belo Monte 
split off to form the Xingu Alive Forever Movement (Movimento Xingu Vivo para Sempre = MXVPS), bet-
ter known simply as “Xingu Vivo” (www.xinguvivo.
org.br/). Xingu Vivo was founded at the May 2008 
Second Encounter of the Indigenous Peoples of the 
Xingu. This group, led by Antônia Melo, became (and 
continues to be) the main grassroots organization 
contesting Belo Monte. The websites of the different 
organizations give the impression that they all have a 
continuous history of joint struggle for common goals. Not reported are the various disagreements and splits 
in these groups. Additional divisions among local dam opponents occurred as the result of a visit to Altamira 
by Lula in June 2010 (Bratman 2014: 277; Salm 2010), 
where, at a rally held in the city’s soccer stadium, or-ganizers of the event were able to aggravate splits 
between local social organizations (Marcelo Salazar, 
public statement, 29 January 2016). Former allies wound up shouting at each other across a police bar-rier (Bratman 2014: 277).
The Movement of Dam-Affected People (MAB) has been an important national group opposing dams 
since its founding in 1991 (e.g., Rothman 2001). How-
ever, MAB is allied with the PT and helped in the 2002 
presidential campaign. When the PT won the elec-
tion and subsequently made Belo Monte a top prior-
ity, MAB softened its stance at the national level. MAB 
only arrived in Altamira in 2009, where it has concen-trated on organizing urban residents who would be displaced in Altamira to demand better compensation (Bratman 2015: 70). In 2009 Dom Erwin publically 
criticized MAB’s dropping its opposition to Belo Mon-
te as reflecting the fact that the group’s advocacy for 
the displaced population logically required the dam 
project to go forward (Bratman 2014: 277-278). The non-indigenous opponents of the dam hail from 
three distinct groups. One is the urban residents of 
Altamira who were displaced, officially 5141 urban families (Villas-Bôas et al. 2015: 12), or about 25,000 
people. The second is the traditional riverside resi-dents (ribeirinhos) who lived on the shores and islands 
in what is now the Belo Monte reservoir (3568 fami-
lies or about 18,000 people) (Villas-Bôas et al. 2015: 
13), and the ribeirinhos along the “reduced flow” 
stretch of the Big Bend of the Xingu, who have also 
lost their livelihoods from fishing (e.g., De Francesco and Carneirom 2015). This author had the privilege of spending some time with ribeirinhos in what is now 
the reservoir while advising a master’s dissertation on their livelihoods (da Silva-Forsberg and Fearnside 
1995, 1997); the knowledge and skills of these people 
will be of little use in the housing project on Travessão 
No. 27 (a side road branching off the Transamazon 
Highway) where they have now been forcibly relocat-
ed (e.g., MPF 2015; Villas-Bôas et al. 2015: 126). The third group is the small farmers in the Transamazon 
Highway colonization areas near Altamira; this group 
is now divided, with many having switched sides to 
support the dam.
Celebrities of various types represent one of the out-
side groups that has helped to give public visibility to 
the impacts of Belo Monte. In 2011, for example, 19 
soap-opera stars from Brazil’s Globo television net-
work made a video criticizing the dam, albeit with some inaccuracies (Movimento Gota d’Água 2011). A 
counter-video supporting the dam was produced by a 
group of engineering students at the State University 
of Campinas (UNICAMP) (Tempestade em Copo d’Água 
2011). The counter-video was converted into a cover article in Veja magazine (Eler and Diniz 2011), which 
was reprinted and widely distributed in Altamira by 
the dam consortium. I recommend my debate with the 
students’ teacher on the Terra internet television net-work (Terra TV 2011).Various international celebrities have visited Altami-
ra and spoken out against Belo Monte. These include 
rock singer Sting in 1989, filmmaker James Cameron 
and actress Sigourney Weaver in 2009, and James 
Cameron again in 2011. Actor and former California 
governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who was taken to 
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more than the initial expectations and take longer 
than expected to complete. A review of hundreds of such cases around the world shows this to be the nor-
mal pattern, not an isolated exception (Ansar et al. 
2014). In the case of Belo Monte, the project’s finan-
cial unviability is suggested by the fact that the PT administration had to use all of its powers of politi-
cal persuasion to bully companies and entities such as 
pension funds over which the PT has influence into 
investing in the project against their will (e.g., Sevá 
Filho 2014); Camargo Corrêa, the company involved in 
planning the project from the beginning, only serves as a contractor - not as an investor with its own capi-
tal at risk.The environmental impacts such as greenhouse-gas 
emissions are generally little discussed and are re-duced to unsupported assertions that the dam repre-
sents “green” or “clean” energy (e.g., Fearnside 2012; see Fearnside 2011). Indigenous peoples are por-
trayed as not directly affected, since the downstream 
groups are not underwater. The upstream groups are 
ignored completely, as the upstream dams are never 
mentioned.
The “need” for Belo Monte is questionable, since Bra-
zil has much better energy options. Projections of 
electricity demand underlying Brazil’s dam-building 
plans are grossly exaggerated (Prado et al. 2016). In 
addition, not all of the “demand” is really “need”. Be-
cause only 28.7% of Brazil’s electricity is for domestic use (Brazil, MME/EPE 2015: 44), the easy argument that a decision not to build Belo Monte would mean 
higher electricity bills in Brazilian cities distorts the 
question at hand. Most of the power from Belo Monte 
is not intended for household use, let alone for extend-
ing electricity to remote areas without access to pow-
er. Substantial amounts of electricity go to industries 
with little benefit for the Brazilian population. A logi-
cal starting point in reforming energy policy is elimi-
nating the export of electricity in the form of elec-
tro-intensive commodities such as aluminum, which 
generate little employment in the country (Fearnside 
2016). Brazil has major opportunities to reduce en-
ergy use by improvements in energy efficiency and 
in the transmission and distribution systems, and 
the country has enormous potential for wind and so-
lar generation that receives only token priority when 
compared to hydropower (Baitelo et al. 2013; Bermann 2002; Moreira 2012). Most recently, Brazil’s president 
vetoed all funding for “non-hydraulic renewable ener-
gy” in Brazil’s 2016-2019 Pluri-Annual Plan (ISA 2016). 
the Xingu by his friend James Cameron in 2011, then 
refused to comment publically on Belo Monte (per-
sonal observation). The involvement of foreign celeb-rities has been controversial both inside and outside of Brazil (see Jampolsky 2012). Bianca Jagger has been 
the most consistently active celebrity in speaking and 
writing about Belo Monte (e.g., Jagger 2013).
The Federal Public Ministry (Ministério Público Fed-
eral = MPF), which was created by Brazil’s 1988 con-
stitution as a special prosecutors’ office in defense of 
the interests of the people, has had a very important 
role, especially the branches in Belém and Altamira. 
The MPF has brought series of suits against the dam based on the various failures to follow the licensing procedures and the violation of constitutional and le-
gal provisions, such as the requirements for consulta-
tion of indigenous peoples. Other actors include international human-rights agen-
cies, such as the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) (see: AIDA 2016). A number of academics and members of the press have had roles in obtaining 
and distributing information. Over the years, a series of books with collections of papers on Belo Monte has been an important source of information in the strug-
gle, notably Santos and de Andrade (1990), Sevá Filho and Switkes (2005), Magalhães and Hernández (2009), 
de Oliveira and Cohn (2014) and an annex to the online version of Villas-Bôas et al. (2015).
3.  The debate on Belo Monte: Arguments cast aside
The pro-dam side largely succeeded in casting aside 
the various arguments questioning Belo Monte. Most popular perception and mainstream media reporting 
portray the dam as a wise investment for the country 
with minimal impacts and as a project that is needed 
to lower electricity bills and avoid blackouts in Brazil-
ian homes (e.g., Eler and Diniz 2011). However, these 
perceptions are mistaken on all counts.
The economic arguments have been effectively de-bunked (de Sousa Júnior and Reid 2010; de Sousa Júnior 
et al. 2006). The dam was economically indefensible 
even at the low construction costs initially foreseen. 
By 2013 the cost was already (at least) double the ex-pectation when the decision was made to build the 
dam (e.g., Veja 2013). In fact, this is part of a general 
pattern worldwide, where dams normally cost much 
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Questioning of the legality of the project is little un-
derstood. What appears in television news and most newspaper accounts is limited to a simple statement 
that an injunction halting the dam was “toppled” (der-
rubado) by a given judge. The perception is that there 
must therefore have been no merit to the injunction 
halting the project. Not mentioned is the fact that the 
injunction may be based on dozens of pages detailing 
violation of multiple laws, while the decision toppling 
the injunction consists of a few lines invoking a secu-
rity suspension without even touching on the mer-
its of the case. The history of Belo Monte has amply 
shown that “the law is not a sufficient guarantee of 
enforcing rights” (Graeff 2012: 277). There is little im-
petus to change the security suspension laws because 
only a tiny fraction of the Brazilian population knows 
of the existence of these laws, which allow judicial de-
cisions to be reversed if they imply “grave damage” to 
the public economy (Fearnside 2015).
4.  International connectionsOne of the factors that weakened involvement of in-ternational NGOs in the Belo Monte struggle was the 
fact that the dam was, at least on paper, entirely paid 
for by Brazilian sources. Brazil’s National Bank for 
Economic Development (BNDES) financed 80% of the 
total cost, and the rest was obtained from the pension 
funds and other sources over which the PT had influ-ence (Rojas and Millikan 2014: 38). However, some of 
the funds may have come from taxpayers abroad, as 
BNDES was apparently serving as a conduit for mon-
etary flows from international sources such that pro-tections were avoided that would bar funding high-
impact projects like Belo Monte. “Development policy 
loans” (DPLs) have become the predominant form of 
World Bank lending in recent years, representing over 
half of the World Bank’s total lending (see BIC 2009). 
These loans essentially escape from the review sys-tem that was set up within the World Bank in the late 
1980s to avoid environmentally and socially damag-
ing projects. DPLs come with a series of “triggers” 
(World Bank jargon for conditions), and the loans therefore represent an inducement for the recipient 
country to change its policies in ways and at a pace 
that otherwise might not be adopted. 
In the case of the first US$ 1.3 billion DPL to Brazil 
for environmental policy, most of the “triggers” were 
worthwhile changes for the environment, although 
some, such as accelerating Brazil’s environmental li-
censing process, were not. The open-ended support 
for Brazil’s National Plan for Climate Change (Brazil, 
CIMC 2008) is potentially also questionable, since pro-
moting hydroelectric dams is a major feature of the 
plan. The World Bank’s evaluations of DPLs (e.g., Lun-
dell 2011) are strictly a checking off of the “triggers” 
that have been met – not an assessment of how the 
money was actually used. NGOs have long criticized 
the possibility of the money being used for projects 
like Belo Monte, since the World Bank essentially does 
not know where the money goes (Amigos da Terra 
Amazônia Brasileira et al. 2009). Even if the money is used in the environmental areas associated with the 
policies that justify the funding, the funds indirectly 
free up other funds for environmentally damaging 
projects like dams. The development policy loans to 
Brazil essentially go into a common pot in BNDES, and 
this government bank then uses the funds to finance 
individual projects, such as Belo Monte. Belo Monte 
received a series of loans with highly favorable terms 
that would be unavailable to virtually any other devel-
opment project (e.g., Rojas and Millikan 2014). BNDES 
charged the Belo Monte consortium only 4% annual 
interest on a 30-year-loan, while the Brazilian govern-
ment simultaneously financed itself by selling short-term bonds at 10% interest (Leitão 2010). The dam consortium also obtained an unusual series of loan 
extensions and other modifications of the terms after 
the first DPL had been granted (Millikan and Garzón 
2015). BNDES also ignored its own internal regula-tions in releasing the funds for Belo Monte without an 
evaluation of economic viability and socio-environ-mental risks (Garzón et al. 2015: 131). The relation-
ship between the BNDES leadership (appointed by the 
federal government) and politically motivated loans 
has now become exposed by the Lava Jato corruption 
investigation (e.g., Stauffer 2015). The powerful effect of international funding on re-
source struggles is apparent from past history. A case 
in point is POLONOROESTE, the program that rebuilt 
and paved the BR-364 (Cuiabá-Porto Velho) Highway 
and opened Rondônia to migration and massive de-forestation (Fearnside 1987). Funding from the World 
Bank meant that taxpayers in North America and Eu-
rope had paid for part of the destruction they were 
seeing on their television screens. An exposé on the 
US television program “Sixty Minutes” was the key 
stimulus for the World Bank’s creating its environ-
ment department in 1987 (Wade 2011). Belo Monte 
now presents an opportunity for World Bank reforms, 
such as ending the use of financial intermediaries to 
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